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Abstract  
The distinction between legitimate oligopoly and cartels is tackled by each competition authority. A parallel behaviour in an 
oligopolistic market might be seen as an anchor f
the decisions of other competitors, trying to keep a realistic and competitive position to ensure welfare. Cartels offer an opposite 
perspective of what competition really means. Apart from the observation of the econometrical model presented in the article, the 
final assessment should consider the particularities of the legal and economic environment, to conclude on the existence of a cartel 
based on reasonable grounds. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition law and policy forbids all types of anti-competitive agreements, either express agreement or implicit 
 
The evidences used by the competition authorities in order to demonstrate an agreement could be classified into 
two categories: direct evidences or circumstantial (indirect) evidences. Whenever the agreement cases could not be 
built based on direct evidence, the courts require additional evidences proving their existence, including evidences of 
of market structure etc.   
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A certain type of circumstantial evidence consists in economic evidences, these including on the one hand, 
 
 In this article, the first part is designed to find out whether parallel behaviour could help us to sustain the necessary 
legal proof  of collusion. Further on, in the next section, we will examine whether the two phenomena  
 may contribute to inference that firms colluded. 
indicators of agreements or concerted practices. However, this reasoning could seem contrary to theoretical results. 
We will make a connection between market outcome  what we are able to observe - - what 
antitrust prohibition aims at.    
Thus, we will present a competition model based on prices, with differentiated outputs in which the demand and 
costs fluctuate in time. If the market is disrupted by demand or supply shocks corresponding to all companies, we will 
understanding which of them occurred. We will also show that a competitive equilibrium is characterized by a greater 
 
The ability to relate to a possible collusive behaviour is based on the fact that, if enterprises wish to avoid 
consequences on competition, they should adopt a similarly conduct. By observing market dynamics concerning 
prices, volumes and market shares according to such a system, we could suppose that companies have initiated a joint 
plan as a result of their agreement.  
 
2. Collusive equilibrium and the legal evidence of the agreement  
defines an anti-competitive practice, for the second ones it shows a market result in which the prices are above the 
competitive equilibrium, identified by the static equilibrium of a game, regardless of the way by which this result is 
achieved.  
 
A question that often appears in the literature in the field is whether we could conclude that companies colluded 
from observing a collusive outcome. Both collusive behaviour and collusive equilibrium are not in a necessary relation 
nor in a sufficient one, the response to the question mentioned above being probably a negative one.  
Economists have demonstrated that an agreement (accord/conspiracy) is neither necessary nor sufficient (because 
it is illegal and facultative) in order to achieve a collusive equilibrium. It results logically that, if we were able to 
establish with certainty that the equilibrium is collusive or competitive, this could not prove convincingly that an 
agreement occurred or not.    
Further on, we will show that there is a distinct answer if we ask the following question in a different way: Could 
we pretend that, by observing a collusive equilibrium, it contributes to the establishment of a legal evidence of 
collusive behaviour?  Thus we will try to demonstrate that such a situation is possible. A legal proof, unlike a logical 
or mathematical one, does admit a certain degree of uncertainty. A supposed infrigement is legally proved if the 
probability that the legislator pay attention to an illegal event, p, surpasses a certain threshold, s, defined by the 
standard of the evidence. In order to make a decision, a court gathers evidences affecting the value of probability 
designed by p.   
As a consequence, we could say that p represents the probability that a supposed violation, I, has appeared, being 
influenced by the evidences gathered by the court, E. We write formally that: ( / )p P I E . 
Now, if there is an additional evidence, e, we could say that: it contributes 
( / ) ( / )P I E e P I E ; it does not contribute  ( / ) ( / )P I E e P I E ; it is 
irrelevant if this probability remains unchanged, meaning  ( / ) ( / )P I E e P I E .   
Being e a collusive result,  I, a collusive agreement and  ( )P I p  as (unconditional) probability of the event I 
before knowing that the result is a collusive or a competitive one, as a consequence ( / )P e I  is the probability of e 
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conditioned by I and ( / )P e I is the (conditioned) probability of e appearing in the situation when companies do not 
agree in the legal sense.   
( / )P e I and ( / )P e I   I or I , occured. 
Next we will make the following assumption regarding these beliefs:   
 
Assumption:  The probability of a collusive result is higher when enterprises achieve a tacit agreement, i.e.
( / ) ( / )P e I P e I . 
 
This assumption seems to be natural and it could be justified either intuitively or by reference to some experimental 
results. However, the most convincing argument is that the same assumption offers the reason for prohibiting anti-
competitive practices. The social welfare is, in fact, reduced if the result is collusive and, as a consequence, it would 
be irrational to forbid the collusive behaviour, unless assumption is true.  
After the court found the collusive result or the competitive one, it will update its beliefs concerning the 
infringement of competition rules.  
the equilibrium is collusive, we will arrive to conclude that it is more probable for the enterprises to have infringed 
competition rules, as shown within the following proposition.   
 
 Proposition. Observing a collusive result contributes to the legal demonstration of a collusive conduct if and only 
if the above assumption takes place.   
 
We note with I  
P = the unconditional probability of I before having observed the market outcome  
and e = the evidence that the result is a collusive one.  
ty that a court agrees with the event I after 
collecting the evidence e is the following one: 
( / )( / )
( / ) ( / )(1 )
P e I pP I e
P e I p P e I p
 
Then, ( / )P I e p  if and only there is a succession of some equivalent relations:  
( / )P I e p  
( / )
( / ) ( / )(1 )
P e I p p
P e I p P e I p  
( / ) 1
( / ) ( / )(1 )
P e I
P e I p P e I p  
( / ) ( / ) ( / )(1 )P e I P e I p P e I p  
( / ) ( / ) ( / )(1 )P e I P e I p P e I p  
( / )(1 ) ( / )(1 )P e I p P e I p  
( / ) ( / )P e I P e I  
 
This proposition establishes the fact that, by observing a collusive result, we could increase the probability that 
companies had agreed, in a juridical sense. This result determines us to notice that every market indicator showing a 
collusive behaviour does contribute to the demonstration process regarding the assumption that there is an illegal 
agreement. Therefore, we could focus on the economic terms of an agreement. A direct demonstration of a collusive 
216   Mihail Buşu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  6 ( 2013 )  213 – 223 
result is usually as hard to prove as in the case of a collusive accord, because it requires information concerning costs 
and demand which are rarely available. Therefore, in order to identify the nature of market results, we need also 
indirect evidences.  
3. The econometrical model 
The purpose of the model that we are presenting below is to verify if the existence of parallel behaviour regarding 
 
The model used within the present paper defines a market duopoly with differentiated outputs, but which belong 
to the same relevant market. We suppose that, in the case of an agreement, companies will make decisions leading to 
the increase of joint profits under the threat of returning to a market with competitive risks in the situation of deviation 
from the initial agreement.  
In our model, the dynamics of business strategies is due to the change in cost and demand conditions and not to the 
passage from a competitive equilibrium to a collusive one or vice versa.   
Supposing that, in the case of an agreement, companies are able to adopt the strategy corresponding to the collusive 
equilibrium, following the evolutions of supply and demand. Similarly, parallel behaviour might occur from the 
oligopolistic nature o  
change, the same equilibrium (collusive or competitive) will remain without any variations. In such a case, the prices, 
two possible behaviours.  
Therefore, we should suppose that the equilibrium is interrupted occasionally by shocks (treated generally as 
-
subsequent conduct.  
There are two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, shocks are common to all companies affecting their costs or 
demand. Within the second scenario, only one of the two enterprises will suffer a shock followed by a change in its 
cost or demand.  
ng costs and demand. 
specific variables.   
By applying the model for the two scenarios, competition or agreement, we will see how the modifications of 
prices, quantities or market shares due to joint or individual shocks, establish the specific circumstances  in which 
s assumption.  
 
3.1.  Description of the model 
The model describes a duopoly market with heterogeneous outputs. Variables for the two enterprises are indexes 
i, j  
max{ ,0}i i i jx a p p  
The demand functions for the two enterprises are described by the following equations:  
Parameter  belongs to the interval [0, 1] and it indicates the degree of substitutability between the two outputs.  
They are perfectly independent if = 0 and they are perfectly substitutable if =1.  
Parameter ia indicates the reserve price for the output of enterprise i corresponding to consumer with the highest 
willingne i is 
superior to i ja p , the consumers would not be disposed to buy that product. 
An incremental increase of the value corresponding to the parameter ia indicates an expansion of the market of 
product i. 
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The two enterprises hold a constant efficiency technology generating constant marginal costs, which, despite all 
these, could be different.  The functions of total costs are described by the following equations:  
.i i iC c x  
Within the model, we will suppose that the value of the reserve price ia is greater than the production cost ic , 
otherwise the production of product i could be individually and socially inefficient.  
The profit functions of the two enterprises are the following ones:  
( )i i i ix p c                                                                                                                                            (1) 
The function for the joint profit is: 
i j                                                                                                                                                   (2) 
where , 1,2,i j i j  
3.2.  Equilibrium 
Supposing that we are in the situation in which there is a game competitive equilibrium in the market described by 
a couple of prices that form a Nash equilibrium. This sort of equi
 
As a consequence, the competitive equilibrium prices are described by the following equations:   
 
 
 
                                                                              (3) 
                                                                                        
 
equilibrium prices within an agreement will be obtained by solving the equation maximization problem .  
onsisting of the first order conditions, we will get:   
 
 
 
                                                                              (4) 
                                                                                                                                                             
Given the demand functions and the equilibrium prices, in the two cases, competition and collusion, we could 
calculate the quantities produced by the companies within the two types of equilibrium and then the respective market 
shares. These quantities are indicated by cis  and 
m
is .  
These values, as functions of cost and demand variables are obtained from the following equation:   
 
 
                                                                              (5) 
                                                                                                                                                               
( )
( , , , )
( )(1 )
i i jm
i i j i j
i j i j
a c c
s a a c c
a a c c
 
                                                                                (6) 
 
   
After defining the values of variables observed in equilibrium in the both cases, competition and agreement, we 
will see if it is possible to distinguish between the two scenarios by observing their dynamics.  
 In the following  section we will verify this possibility supposing that there will be supply shocks leading to 
changes of marginal costs, ic ia . 
2
2( ) ( )
( , , , )
4
i i j jc
i i j i j
c a c a
p a a c c
2( , , , ) 2 2(1 )
i jm i
i i j i j
a acp a a c c
2( 2) ( )
( , , , )
(2 )( ( )(1 ))
i i j j ic
i i j i j
i j i j
a c a c c
s a a c c
a a c c
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1c and 2c or the variables 1a and 2a  are perfectly 
1c and 2c or the variables 1a  
and 2a are perfectly independent. 
 
3.3.   
In the situation of joint shocks, the variables describing costs or those characterizing the demand are perfectly 
correlated. This means that each variable represents a linear transformation of the variable with which it is linked.  
Therefore, we could note: 
 
 
 
where t = 1,2...n indicates the observation period.  
By substituting those two equations within the equations of equilibrium prices (3) and (4), we will get: 
 
 and 
, 
where: 
 
 
 
 
 
Because of the fact that prices values, including the equilibrium ones, are linear transformations of identical 
variables  ia  and ic , we get the correlation coefficient of those prices equal to 1 both in the case of collusive 
equilibrium and in that of competitive equilibrium. All these are very well illustrated in the following two scenarios:  
 
 1st Scenario. In the situation in which the market is affected by joint shocks (perfectly correlated) in relation to the 
cost/the demand or both of them, then as a consequence, both competitive prices and the collusive ones are perfectly 
correlated.   
 
Observing the dynamics of prices and the corresponding parallelism, they do not allow us to make the distinction 
between a collusive equilibrium and a competitive one.    
We take now into consideration the situation of some independent shocks of those two enterprises. We suppose 
that the relative parameters of the enterprise 2 remain constant, varying only those of the enterprise 1. We also assume 
that 2 1ta and 2 0tc . 
The equilibrium prices in a competitive environment and in the case of a collusive accord are given by the following 
series obtained from the equations (3) and (4): 
2 1t c t cc c d e
2 1 ,t a t aa a d
c c c c
it i it i it ip c a d
m m m m
it i it i it i ip c a d
1 1 12 2
(2 ) (2 ); ; ;
4 4
c cc a
2 2 22 2
(2 ) (2 ); ; 2;
4 4
c cc a
2
( ) ;
4
c a cd dd
1 1 12 2
(1 )1 ; ; ;
2 2(1 ) 2(1 )
m m ma add
2
2 2 22 2
( ) (1 ); ; .
2 2(1 ) 2(1 )
m m mc a c ad dd
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 and 
 
 
The two price series corresponding to the competitive equilibrium are perfectly correlated despite the existence of 
the shocks specific to enterprise 1 and, therefore, there is a lack of correlation between the costs of those firms or 
to be parallel if the market is a competitive one. The price series corresponding to a collusive equilibrium is not present 
at all. However, there is no correlation in the case of the existence of specific shocks linked to costs, as it is proved by 
the absence of the variable 1c   in the equation of equilibrium price characterizing the enterprise 2. This fact is 
demonstrated within the following scenario:  
 
2nd Scenario. In the case in which the market is affected by individual shocks (completely independent) in relation 
to the cost/the demand or both of them, competitive prices are perfectly correlated while collusive prices are mutually 
uncorrelated.   
 
As a consequence, by observing a parallel trend of prices related to the existence of prices specific shocks, we note 
that there is a competitive equilibrium. These results could be understood even at an intuitively level if we take into 
Moreover,  
Within a market where there is an agreement, after the emergence of some individual shocks, enterprises could 
change their behaviour towards prices, so that they will reflect a greater contribution or a smaller one to the 
achievement of joint profits.  
 will be reflected in a higher way. The rival enterprise will be 
firm. Moreover, this enterprise will continue to enjoy the benefits of joining the agreement.   
an agreement.  
 
3.4. Shocks impact analysis on market shares 
The stability of market shares is considered an indication of the existence of an agreement 
in the form of collusive practice. The conjuncture that justifies this inference states that 
if the competition was not artificially reduced, companies would experience ample oscillations 
of their relative positions. Also to verify this, is necessary to suppose that the market is disrupted by some shock. In 
fact, if the conditions of supply and demand remain unchanged, this would be reflected in the shares of individual 
companies both in a competitive market or in a collusive one. This would be done even if the demand conditions and 
demand for individual companies varied but leaving unchanged their positions in the market. So, we focus only the 
case in whichmarket equilibrium can be modified by shock, both common and specific, but changing the relative 
position of the competitors. We will consider separately the case of a shock on the costs and to a shock in demand. 
1 1
1 2 2
2 2 ;
4 4
c t t
t
c ap
1 1
2 2 2
2 ;
4 4
c t t
t
c ap
1 1
1 22 2(1 )
m t t
t
c ap
1
2 2
1 .
2(1 )
m t
t
ap
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Let us assume, 1 2 1t ta a  and 2 0tc . Substituting these values in equations (5) and (6) expressing the 
company's market share in the two cases of balance competitive and collusive. To verify the effect of a variation in 
the cost of the single firm 1on the market shares of the two companies, in both cases, competeing or colluding, we 
calculate the derivative of the functions (5) and (6), relating to the company first, in relation to its costs.We obtain: 
1
2
1 1 1
( 1) 2 ;
(2 )(2 )
cs
c c c
 
1
2
1 1 1
1 .
(2 )
ms
c c c
 
 
Given the permissible values of , both derivatives are negative, demonstrating that in a competitive equilibrium, 
and in a collusive equilibrium, an enterprise obtains changes of its market share in the opposite direction to the change 
in their costs. However we will compare the amplitude of this variation. So, we calculate the difference between the 
absolute values of these two derivatives, obtaining: 
 
1 1
2
1 1 1 1
2 (1 ) .
(2 )(2 )
c ms s
c c c c
 
 
This difference is always negative - since  is non-negative - except in the case of goods 
independent (where = 0). This proves that, if there is a change in the cost of the first company, the change in its 
market share (and similarly fot the second company), is smaller when we have a  competitive market.  
 
3rd Scenario. If there is an impact on the cost, firms market shares are more stable in a competitive market. 
 
Now we consider changes in the relative positions of the two companies in relation to demand.We set 1 2 0c c
and 2 1a . Performing calculations, we obtain: 
 
1
1 1
2 ;
(2 )( 1)
cs
a a
 
1
1 1
1
( 1)
ms
a a
and 
1 1
1 1 1
2 .
(2 )( 1)
c ms s
a a a
 
 
The two derivatives have both positive sign, while the difference between their  absolute values is always negative 
with the exception of goods perfectly independent. The latter result strengthens the evidence previously obtained and 
the following proposition. 
 
4th Scenario. If there is an impact on the demand side, the market shares of the firms are more stable if the 
equilibrium is competitive. 
 
The economic basis of these results is the same as that shown previously. Impact of changes in cost or demand lead 
to changes of the same sign in market share both in a competitive equilibrium, and in a collusive one.  
However, in a collusive market,  companies define their own market strategies with the aim of maximizing their 
profits. Therefore, there allocation of the amount resulting from a modification of the terms of the offer or demand 
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takes into account not only the consequences that this reallocation has on the profits of companies that change theirs 
strategic behavior, as it would in a competitive, but also those relating to the profits of other  members of the 
agreement. That involves variations of greater amplitude and is reflected in a reduced stability of the market shares. 
It could be argued that a company which suffers a worsening of the costs will not accept an agreement that involves a 
sacrifice of the market share greater than that would occur in the absence of the agreement. This claim fail to recognize 
that if the agreement is rejected, the same company would have a higher market share, but with lower profits.  If its 
aim is to maximize profits and not its market share, then the company will accept the agreement.  
In the next section we will illustrate with a numerical simulation cases in which shocks on costs or demand are 
neither perfect nor perfectly specific areas. This simulation will also graphically illustrate the effects of a collusion.  
 
4. Numerical simulation  
To solve the analytical model, especially in the cases in which shocks are not perfectly joint or well specified, does 
seem a complex problem. In this section, we will present a numerical simulation of an intermediate event.   
Simulation is performed assuming the following initial values: 1 2 10a a , 1 2 1c c   and  0,9 . Next 
we have generated 30 observations in which the costs of the two enterprises were chosen so that they vary with an 
approximate correlation of 0,5.   
The values of the costs chosen in this simulation are presented within the Table 1.  
 
Orbs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
C1 1 1,3 1,04 0,94 1,03 1,13 1,36 1,9 2,28 2,4 2,88 2,3 1,61 1,29 1,16 
C2 1 1,1 0,99 1,09 0,98 0,78 0,84 0,92 0,73 0,88 0,97 1,07 1,28 1,15 1,27 
 
Orbs 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
C1 1,28 1,53 1,68 1,85 2,04 2,65 2,91 2,33 2,56 2,05 1,85 2,03 2,23 2,46 2,21 
C2 1,39 1,81 2,18 2,61 2,09 2,51 2,76 3,03 2,43 2,67 2,94 3,52 3,88 4,65 3,72 
Source: own processing 
 
By introducing those numerical values in the equations presented above, we obtain data series for sale prices 
corresponding to enterprise 1 and respectively to enterprise 2, both in the competitive case and in the collusive one:  
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,  Source: own processing 
 
 
, Source: own processing 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present the equilibrium price of the two enterprises within a competitive market and also in a 
collusive one. We could easily see that the first two series do have a greater parallelism degree than the latter.  
Statistical analysis confirms this visual impression considering that the correlation coefficient at the equilibrium point 
corresponding to prices in the case of competition is 0, 9 while the correlation coefficient regarding collusive prices 
is (as it is always) equal to that of costs, respectively 0,5. 
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5. Conclusions 
We have verified above the possibility of identifying different phenomena occurring whenever there is a parallel 
behaviour or an agreement. Within antitrust investigations, the existence of a parallel behaviour consisting in 
ity could represent evidences 
of the presence of an artificial restriction of the competition. This seems to have in parallel two opposite meanings for 
what we could alternatively interpreted as collusion or competition symptoms. By using the econometric model 
presented above, we could observe that the competitive equilibrium supposes a constant proportionality in time of 
agreement or of companie
participants, as a consequence of the decision taken for practicing the same price.   
ases, these 
allow us to make a distinction between the two conditions. Thus, when concluding on the relevance of the model 
applied, one should pay attention to the specific economic and legal conditions existent on the market in a certain 
period of time in which undertakings adopted a similar conduct. 
Intuition says that the change of the competitive environment by the means of an agreement aims to standardize 
business strategies and their performance. On the other hand, we should not forget that the main purpose of an 
agreement is not that of maintaining the market share of participants, but rather to increase their profits which are 
different from the ones achieved independently. The choices of price, of the quantity and of the market share derived 
from those ones are classified as comparative means to this end.  
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